Inductive Knowledge Paradox Essay -- Philosophy Reasoning

In Nelson Goodmans The new riddle of induction, the problem of inducive knowledge is brought into question and a collection of possible final results are presented. The problem of inductive knowledge has been misunderstood into bringing forth a radical political orientation of relativism by philosophers such as Quine and a variety of other red-brick thinkers, so far a possible solution presented by Hempel and a new variant outlined in this paper present a different case all together concerning the acquisition of knowledge. In order to understand the new paradox presented in this paper the argument presented in the original prey paradox has to be made clear. The paradox of the raven stems from the belief that viewed scientific phenomena, in participation to a hypothesis in fact does not necessarily lead to truth but instead simply serves to strengthen the held hypothesis regardless of what facts the register presents. The belief that all ravens are fateful under normal scientific standards is thought as being supported by the evidence of only black ravens being observed, in logic such a statement would be described as their being such a thing that it is a raven and it is black. From this statement a logically equivalent hypothesis can be made, if an object is not black it holds that it is not a raven, this statement unlike the sign hypothesis of all ravens being black however presents problems, all evidence of non-black objects seems to strengthen the prior held belief even though there is virtually no connection between all those possible objects and the raven. The observation of non-black things that are not-ravens strengthening the hypothesis unjustifiably is arguably showing how inductive reasoning is ungrounded in truth, however Hempel ... ...r a possible world, which itself is a problem. The issue of inductive knowledge is still one that remains unsolved, however in the various attempts at a solution the problem has changed from being one of a seemingly impossible actual knowledge to a further examination into a criterion of meaning. Because of the misinterpretation of this paradox there has been a great deal of confusion over the legitimacy of modern science however the paradox itself can be seen as only a matter of philosophy and is more concerned with the solution to a long standing philosophical puzzle then a critique of modern science. Works CitedNelson Goodman, The new riddle of induction knowledge readings in contemporary epistemology, oxford university press 2005. Willard Quine, Two dogmas of empiricism From a logical point of view second edition, Harvard university press 1980.